



SIDC OPSCOM Report Automatic Partial Decoupling

Intraday Auction 3 Delivery Date 13/07/2026


13.07.2026

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1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.

1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.

At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.


Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.

MCSC Daily Timeline

SDAC – SIDC – IDA daily timeline

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


SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T

IDA timeline

Before IDA, the IDC CZC trading can be halted no more than **20 minutes**

During IDA, the IDC CZC trading can be halted no more than **20 minutes** under normal operation



1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure the correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting the Intraday Auction 3 on 13/7/2026, resulting in automatic partial decoupling of several NEMOs in line with procedures. The incident occurred due to a local issue on GME side which prevented the provision of GME OBKs before the deadline for automatic partial decoupling. During the IDA3 session DD20260713 GME was not able to generate OBKs before the automatic partial decoupling deadline due to an unexpected and unpredictable anomaly affecting the network infrastructure of a third-party cloud service provider used by GME. The experienced issues included intermittent and discontinuous Internet connection in the production environment (affecting both the primary and backup channels). Therefore, automatic partial decoupling was triggered.

2.1 Course of Events

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
Incident occurrence	13/07/2026; 9:57	13/07/2026; 9:58
Triggering of Incident Committee	13/07/2026; 9:58	13/07/2026; 10:38
Final version of network data from GME missing in coordinator PMB for IDA3 DD20260713	13/07/2026; 10:03	
OBK from GME still missing in PMB so IDA coordinator asked one of parties that remain coupled to perform coordinator switch in order to be ready for APD	13/07/2026; 10:06	
One of the parties that remained coupled took over the coordinator role in line with procedure for APD.	13/07/2026; 10:07	

Event	Start	End
Deadline for automatic partial decoupling was reached and GME confirmed that they could not send the Order Book , so automatic partial decoupling process started.	13/07/2026; 10:12	
Partial Decoupling message: IDA_JOINT_07: IDA Partial Decoupling was sent to market participants and borders for decoupled areas were reopened for cross border trading	13/07/2026; 10:18	
Results for parties that remained coupled (HENEX, OMIE) were published	13/07/2026; 10:21	

2.3 Incident Cause

The incident was caused by an issue on GME side which they encountered during IDA3 DD20260713 session.

The cause of the issue was an unexpected and unpredictable anomaly affecting the network infrastructure of a third-party cloud service provider used by GME. The anomaly was characterized by intermittent and discontinuous Internet connection in the production environment (affecting both the primary and backup channels), before and during the OBK generation process (between 09:55 and 10:20).

The issue was promptly identified and notified by GME and solved by the cloud service provider.

2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

Impacted NEMOs:

All except OMIE and HENEX.

Impacted Bidding Zones:

All Bidding Zones except ES, PT and GR.

Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:

All Borders except ES-PT

3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learnt

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Short-term Solution by Affected Party	Prompt reaction and solution of the issue by the third-party cloud service provider as immediately requested by GME
Long-term Measures by Affected Party	GME requested a detailed analysis of the event from the cloud service provider, together with continuous monitoring of the situation and the subsequent description of further possible mitigation measures
SIDC Project Lessons Learned	N/A